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█ Riassunto Sintomatologia e politica razziale in Australia - Jindabyne (una pellicola girata da Ray Lawrence nel
2006) si apre con l’uccisione di una giovane donna aborigena; tuttavia il punto su cui questa pellicola effettivamente si concentra è il modo in cui la gente reagisce a questo delitto. Per questo motivo, questo film ci dice molte interessanti verità sui rapporti interrazziali nell’Australia di oggi. La mia proposta è quella di leggere Jindabyne come un’utile allegoria nazionale (nel senso dato a questo lemma da Jameson); il film è una mappa o una cartografia che ritrae i luoghi comuni politici e culturali nella fase storica attuale. Al fondo della mia ipotesi sta il
fatto che non possa essere solo una coincidenza il fatto che Jindabyne dia un tale spazio al problema
dell’apologia culturale in questa particolare congiuntura della storia australiana. Anche se questo aspetto del
film ha avuto poco risalto in alcune delle recensioni che ne hanno accompagnato l’uscita, mi colpisce il carattere
sintomatico della tempistica: si tratta di un tema che, come una volta Deleuze ebbe a dire a proposito della differenza, era già nell’aria. Prodotto solo due anni prima dell’apologia nazionale ufficiale del primo ministro australiano Kevin Rudd agli indigeni d’Australia il 13 febbraio 2008, Jindabyne risponde a un complesso insieme
di problemi culturali che erano all’ordine del giorno della politica nazionale dal 1995, quando fu reso noto Bringing Them Home, il rapporto della Commissione sulle Pari Opportunità e sui Diritti Umani relativo all’inchiesta
di carattere nazionale vertente sulla cosiddetta “Generazione Rubata”.
PAROLE CHIAVE: Razza; Politica australiana; Diritti degli indigeni; Allegoria nazionale; Gilles Deleuze e Felix Guattari.
█ Abstract Jindabyne (a movie directed by Ray Lawrence, 2006) begins with the murder of a young aboriginal
woman, but its real focus is the way people respond to this murder. In doing so, it tells several interesting truths
about race relations in Australia today. I want to suggest that Jindabyne can usefully be read as a national allegory
(in Jameson’s sense of the word). It maps or diagrams the cultural and political tropes of the present moment in
history. My basic hypothesis is that it cannot be a coincidence that Jindabyne should give such prominence to the
cultural problematic of the apology at this particular juncture in Australia’s history. Although this aspect of the
film is scarcely mentioned in any of the reviews that accompanied the film’s premier, it strikes me that the timing is
symptomatic: it is a topic that as Deleuze once said about difference was very much in the air. Produced only two
years before the official national apology the Prime Minister of Australia Kevin Rudd made to the Indigenous
peoples of Australia on February 13, 2008, Jindabyne responds to a complex assemblage of cultural problematics
that have been on the national political agenda ever since the release in 1995 of Bringing Them Home, the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission’s report on its national inquiry into the so-called “Stolen Generation”.
KEYWORDS: Race; Australian Politics; Indigenous Rights; National Allegory; Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.
A previous version of this paper appeared under the title February 13, 2008, or, the Baleful Enchantments of an
Apology, in: «Cultural Critique», vol. VIII, n. 1, 2012, pp. 45-60. The text has been substantially modified.
I. Buchanan - Institute for Social Transformation Research, University of Wollongong ()
E-mail: ibuchana@uow.edu.au

Attribution - Noncommercial - No Derivative Works 3.0

Symptomatology and Racial Politics in Australia
The world is a set of symptoms whose illness
merges with man.
Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical

█ Deleuze’s “clinical” method
IN THIS ONE TANTALISING SENTENCE Gilles
Deleuze sets forth an entire program of study
and though he would turn to it again and
again he never tackled it in anything like the
same systematic manner he approached his
other projects. 1
I would argue Essays Critical and Clinical,
which appeared two years before his death, is
more a tacit admission of failure than the
summation of a project it pretends to be. The
essays it collects, which were written over the
span of a couple of decades, make two things
very clear: first, the notion of “the clinical”
preoccupied Deleuze for a long time – it underpins his early books on Proust and Masoch
and is central to his interest in Kafka (his passion for Proust and Kafka was shared by
Guattari, an important point of commonality
between them rarely if ever mentioned); second, despite several attempts to deploy the
notion of “the clinical” for critical purposes,
Deleuze never succeeded in overcoming the
project’s principal theoretical problem, namely the problem of causation.
Perhaps like the clinicians he mentions,
such as Roger and Parkinson, who identified
diseases but never solved the question of their
causation, it is enough for him that literature is
able to make us aware of certain cultural “syndromes” and there is no need, or indeed any
expectation that they should also disclose the
causes of these syndromes.2 But my sense is
that Deleuze was interested in the problem of
causation – there are several passages on it scattered throughout his work, particularly his collaborative work with Guattari – he just didn’t
figure out how to solve to his satisfaction. 3 In
this sense, the clinical project should be regarded as incomplete: it is an encounter with a
problem, but not yet a full scale engagement
with a problem. It is as much a problem with
his work as it is a problem in his work.
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Problems in a work are not necessarily
flaws, however, and it shouldn’t be thought
that my purpose in saying that the clinical project is problematic is intended as a critique.
On the contrary, it is actually a way of saying
that the clinical project is still worth thinking
about. And I don’t mean this as the proverbial
backhanded compliment.
As Deleuze argues in Difference and Repetition, the first of his books in which, by his
reckoning, he did his own philosophizing,
problems are not simply there to be solved,
after which they disappear. He describes this
view of them as an illusion and argues that it
reduces problems to phantoms. This in turn
has a pernicious effect on the whole of thought,
he argues, because it casts thinking (together
with the truth and falsehood that thinking adduces) as an activity that only commences with
the search for solutions.
According to this infantile prejudice, the
master sets a problem, our task is to solve
it, and the result is accredited true or false
by a powerful authority. It is also a social
prejudice with the visible interest of maintaining us in an infantile state, which calls
upon us to solve problems that come from
elsewhere, consoling or distracting us by
telling us that we have won simply by being
able to respond. 4
In saying this, Deleuze’s aim is to establish
the notion that problems are neither provisional nor contingent; they are not some arbitrary hurdle that the solution dissipates more
or less magically, there only to prop up the solution that never budges from centre stage.
Instead, Deleuze wants to position problems
as the very source of truth in philosophy –
they are «at once both the site of an originary
truth and the genesis of a derived truth». 5
My point is that the fact Deleuze posed an
interesting and remarkable problem he couldn’t
solve does him no discredit. The onus is on us as
inheritors of his legacy to continue with this project and see if the problem cannot be made to
yield a solution and still more truth.6 As I will try
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to show in what follows, there are several good
reasons why we should want to do this.
Deleuze’s “clinical” hypothesis is that the
literary text can be read as a kind of symptomatology of the world in which it is produced.
Rather than revealing an author’s neuroses,
which is how psychoanalysis generally treats
literature, Deleuze’s hypothesis is that the
work is the writer’s diagnosis of the world –
Deleuze will even go so far as to say it is their
indictment of the world. 7
By the same token, the writer doesn’t use
the work to represent the world’s neuroses;
that’s not how art is made according to
Deleuze. The artist doesn’t make their art by
trying to say in a direct way what’s wrong with
the world – this would lead to bad, conceptual
or programmatic art in Deleuze’s view. Neither the writer nor the work can be treated as
“patients” Deleuze argues, and in that sense
they cannot be “psychoanalysed”.
Texts and authors have nothing to tell us
about themselves, or how they were formed,
they have no history (in the psychoanalytic
sense). They can only speak to us about how
they function and the world which produced
them. Texts have surface, but no depth, which
is why Deleuze often describes the analysis of
texts as cartography. For authors, if they are
great, are more like doctors than patients. We
mean that they are themselves astonishing diagnosticians or symptomatologists. 8
The work of art doesn’t exhibit symptoms
in the manner of a patient or a “case”, rather it
isolates, identifies, and tabulates symptoms in
the manner of a clinician or, what amounts to
the same thing for Deleuze, a cartographer.9
Symptoms are the contours of the world, its
grooves, its hills and valleys, its diagram, as
Deleuze also puts it. 10
This is especially true of authors like Masoch and Sade, whose work appears to be
merely the outgrowth of their own peculiar
sexual fantasies. To fail to appreciate that
these authors, to focus only them for a moment, have something essential to tell us about
Masochism and Sadism is, Deleuze argues, to
neglect «the difference between the artist’s

novel as a work of art and the neurotic’s novel». 11
█ Symptoms and allegory
Deleuze never discussed how symptoms are
produced – I want to suggest that Fredric
Jameson offers an answer to this question: history. In The Political Unconscious, which Jameson admits to being inspired by Deleuze and
Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, Jameson proposes that
all literary works are allegories of their time, by
which he means it is only by reconstructing the
historical context in which the works are produced that we can fully understand them. By
context Jameson means the intellectual currents of the times as well as the particular
events and day to day circumstances.12
History, as Jameson sees it, is an active
force that every writer has to confront, so the
choices they make in confronting that force –
choices to do with how they construct their
characters, the shape of the narratives, down
to the style of their sentences – are symptomatic of the times because they way writers
choose to confront history changes with time.
Jameson’s authors are thus every bit as much
clinicians as Deleuze’s, they are constantly
producing symptomatologies, tabulating syndromes and taking the temperature of their
times (to borrow Jameson’s own analogy), the
difference being that Jameson does not shy
away from the question of causation.
In what follows, then, I want to splice
Deleuze’s clinical hypothesis with Jameson’s
and explore the critical possibilities of that fusion in relation to the Australian film Jindabyne (2006), which in my view is one of the
most interesting creative works dealing with
race relations in Australia. It is important, in
my view, because its way of dealing with race
is to examine ordinary Australians and more
especially recent migrants assimilating themselves to Australian ways of living being almost casually racist, that is racist without a
conscious antipathy towards the racial other.
It is the racism of those people who declare
“they’re not racists, but …”, it is the racism of
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those people who think “race isn’t an issue for
them, but…”, it is the racism of those people
who, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, don’t see
others, they just see people who are not like
themselves. 13
My starting point is this: It cannot be a coincidence that this film should give such
prominence to the cultural problematic of the
apology at this particular juncture in Australia’s history. Although this aspect of the film is
scarcely mentioned in any of the reviews that
accompanied the film’s premier, it strikes me
that the timing is symptomatic: it is a topic
that as Deleuze once said about difference was
very much in the air.
Produced only two years before the official
national apology the Prime Minister of Australia Kevin Rudd made to the Indigenous
peoples of Australia on February 13, 2008,
Jindabyne responds to a complex assemblage
of cultural problematics that have been on the
national political agenda ever since the release
in 1995 of Bringing Them Home, the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission’s
report on its national inquiry into the socalled “Stolen Generation” of indigenous people who as children were removed from their
families and placed with white foster families.
For over a decade and a half, and still today, the issue of whether the government
should issue an apology to these children and
what that would mean has been the subject of
widespread public debate in Australia, at all
levels of society. A national apology was one
of the key recommendations of the report, but
it took more than a decade – effectively the
length of time Prime Minister John Howard
was in power – for it to be acted on.
Howard’s rationale was that the present
generation could not be expected to apologise
for acts they themselves were not responsible
for and did not themselves commit, though
perhaps the real reason was that he simply did
not want to expose the government to possible
reparations claims. Rudd’s apology did not confront the questions of blame or responsibility
and quite deliberately steered clear of any suggestion that it could be seen as the precursor to
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reparations. As such, February 13, 2008 marks
the moment of a lost opportunity, or better yet,
that of an event that did not take place.
As welcome as the apology was, it did
nothing material to alter the living conditions
of indigenous Australians. The reason for this
is obviously complex, but central to it, I will
argue, is the fact that it did not confront the
foundational “crime”, if you will, that enabled
the removal of children from their families,
namely the act of dispossession that occurred
when the putative First Settlers planted their
flag at Sydney Cove and claimed the land as
their own. The legacy of this dispossession
continues to inform and give shape to the lives
of all indigenous Australians in ways that are
both obvious and not so obvious.
As has been amply documented, the Australian government’s treatment of the indigenous people since the occupation began in
1788 has been nothing less than appalling.
While statistics can never do justice to the actual pain and suffering endured by the victims,
it is nevertheless sobering to confront the
stark reality that today, as Tatz puts it, the indigenous people are
at the very top, or bottom, of every social indicator available: top of the medical statistics
for diseases they didn’t exhibit as recently as
thirty years ago – coronary disease, cancer,
diabetes, respiratory infections; bottom of
the life expectancy table, at 50-55 years or
less for males and around 55 for females;
with much greater rates of unemployment,
much lower home ownership and considerably lower per capita income; an arrest and
imprisonment rate grossly out of proportion
to their numbers.14
And although things are changing and the
actual living conditions and opportunities to
flourish for indigenous people are improving,
their position at the top and bottom of all such
metrics hasn’t altered at all. Against this background, then, I want to suggest that Jindabyne
can usefully be read as a national allegory (in
Jameson’s sense of the word). 15 It maps or di-
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agrams the cultural and political tropes of the
present moment in history.
The third feature film by the decidedly
non-prolific Australian director Ray Lawrence, whose other credits include Bliss (1985),
from a Peter Carey novel and Lantana (2001),
from Andrew Bovell’s award winning play
Speaking in Tongues (1996). Adapted by Beatrix Christian from Raymond Carver’s short
story ‘So much water so close to home’ (1981),
Jindabyne is a slight departure from Bliss and
Lantana in that it is the work of an American
writer rather than an Australian, but its focus
is as keenly Australian as his previous works. 16
The film transposes Carver’s story from
ex-urban California to a small town in rural
New South Wales, namely Jindabyne. The location is significant or – to use a word not
much in fashion these days – overdetermined
because in the 1960s the original town of
Jindabyne was relocated to make way for a
dam (as part of the Snowy River hydroelectric
scheme). Now almost completely forgotten,
the old town of Jindabyne lurks beneath the
water as an obvious metaphor for the uncertain way the present and the past coexist in
contemporary Australia. 17
Like the Carver story, Jindabyne is about a
group of four men (Gabriel Byrne, John Howard, Stelios Yiakmis, and Simon Stone) who go
on a fly-fishing trip which takes an unexpected
turn. The men discover the half-naked body of a
young Aboriginal woman floating in the river,
but decide not to report it to the police straightaway because to do so would interrupt their
plans for a relaxing couple of days of sport.
When the men return from their weekend
away and finally report their grisly find, word
of what they did – or, more precisely, failed to
do – leaks out and they find themselves being
called to account by family, friends and indeed
the whole town, but are unable, at least the
first instance, to recognise that what they did
was wrong. The resonance here with Australia’s response to the national apology to the Indigenous people is unmistakable.
The film’s symptomatology is brought into
view in four key moments: the first is opening
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scene of the film in which we see a young aboriginal woman abducted and we presume
murdered (we don’t see the actual murder, but
it is obvious that is what happened); second,
the discovery of the body and the failure to
act; third, the denial that a wrong occurred
and the refusal to accept that there is any need
for an apology; fourth, recognition that a
wrong did occur and the offer of an apology.
The whole story turns on the second moment and our shock at the fact that the four
men choose to do nothing, but in some ways
the first moment is more significant. It is worth
noting, on this point, that this opening sequence isn’t found in the original Carver story.
So it is clearly intended to give the film as a
whole a very specific kind of foundation, yet
in doing so it doesn’t conform to our expectations. As with the discovery of the body, the
significance of the first moment lies more in
what didn’t happen than what did happen.
Obviously the murder of a young Aboriginal
woman is not unimportant, but what is noteworthy about this scene is the way it seems to
set up a generic murder-mystery narrative in
which the guilty are located and brought to
justice. But this doesn’t eventuate – the murderer isn’t brought to justice, indeed there isn’t
even an attempt to identify or locate him.
One can imagine that the reason the creators of the film didn’t incorporate this storyline into the film was precisely to avoid turning it into a murder-mystery. Whatever the
reason for this decision, it sets up a very interesting national allegorical frame for the film
inasmuch as it situates the whole story in the
context of a foundational act of violence
against an indigenous person that, like the
founding of the nation itself, is placed outside
the realm of justice.
When the four fishermen discover the
body we expect them to call the police immediately. This is as much a generic expectation
as a cultural expectation in that this is what is
supposed to happen in movies: the discovery
of a body is supposed to initiate action. But in
this case the very opposite happens.
The discovery of the body is met with a
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powerful form of inertia, which is resonant of
the way most Australians respond to the situation of Australia’s indigenous people. But the
inaction of most Australians in the face of the
appalling living conditions of Australia’s indigenous people attracts little or no moral reprobation, whereas when the four fisherman
decide not to act we automatically judge them
to be morally and ethically culpable. But on
what grounds do we make this judgement?
Why does it matter so much that they fail to
contact the police? To put it another way,
what is the nature of the obligation on them to
act that they fail to fulfil?
The answer to this question is not immediately obvious, but our sense of indignation at
the men’s inaction and their apparently callous disregard for the needs of the dead suggests quite strongly that culturally we assume
in whatever inchoate form that the dead impose an obligation on us to grieve or mourn
the extinction of a life.
In western culture, grieving is supposed to
take the form of an interruption of one’s daily
activities, one’s plans, particularly if they are
leisure oriented, to mark the passing of a life,
and this is of course precisely what the four
men fail to do. They observe none of the expected “rites” that we are supposed to perform
in the face of death. Not only do they not report the death to the authorities as we expect
them to, they also continue to enjoy their day,
indeed their weekend, as though death had not
touched them in any way. And indeed, that is
undoubtedly what is most troubling about their
response – death does not seem to touch them.
The body is seen simply as a problem, right
down to whether it should be left in the water
or not. Ultimately they decide not to remove
the body because it is less likely to putrefy in
the cool river water, but they tie it down so it
doesn’t float away. They treat the dead young
woman then as so much meat, a mere corpse,
a body without a face.
█ The face of the other
What does it mean to say the corpse lacks a
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face? We can only answer this question by
first of all asking what it means to have a face.
According to Lévinas 18 the face signifies the
presence of the Other, namely, that which reminds us that we are social beings unable to
survive alone on this planet and, as such, obliged
to consider how we may preserve their life. More
than that, the face calls upon me to meet my ethical obligations to the Other. Its call, Lévinas argues, is unignorable. Given that the men seem
unmoved by the corpse – yes, they are shocked,
but no they aren’t moved by it, they do not perform any of the expected rituals in response to
their discovery – we might conclude that in Lévinasian terms the dead aboriginal woman lacks
a face; or, to put it even more strongly, she
somehow lacks alterity.
Paradoxically, then, it is as though she is
not other enough. Her presence seems not to
impose any immediate or strongly felt ethical
demands on the four fishermen. One cannot
help but think that Lawrence’s decision to
make the victim Aboriginal (and not white as
in the original Carver story) was intended to
make us ask whether the men would have acted differently if the corpse had not been black.
That this question is even conceivable is in itself an indictment on the state of race relations in Australia because it assumes that
there is a profound schism in Australia between the hegemonic “white” or “nonAboriginal” population and the Aboriginal
people and that this schism does indeed have a
moral and ethical dimension to it.
We cannot know if the men would have
acted differently if they’d found a white
corpse, but we can say that they do not appear
to grieve the loss of life that they are witness
to and appear not to have any sense that they
ought to grieve, where grieving would mean
interrupting their daily routines and plans in
order to take time to feel the loss of life and to
perform the socially prescribed rituals of
mourning.
As it turns out, feeling is the last thing they
want to do – they respond by rendering themselves insensible with alcohol. They are shocked
by their discovery, but they react to it in the
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same way that one might react to the news that
one’s flight has been cancelled – it is an inconvenience rather than an occasion for grief.
This absence of grief is, as Judith Butler’s
recent work argues, ethically and politically
significant because, as she puts it, it is only
when the loss of life matters that the value of
life becomes apparent. «Only under conditions
in which loss would matter does the value of
the life appear. Thus, grievability is a presupposition for the life that matters».19 As I’ve said
already, this is what is so striking about this
moment in the story – the men do not apprehend the life that was lost as grievable, as mattering. Butler puts it even more strongly.
Without grievability, there is no life, or, rather, there is something living that is other
than life. Instead, ‘there is a life that will
never have been lived’, sustained by no regard, no testimony, and ungrieved when
lost. The apprehension of grievability precedes and makes possible the apprehension
of precarious life. 20
Following Butler’s logic here, we may
speculate that the dead Aboriginal woman is
not grieved because she is not perceived to
have had a life; that is to say, because she is
Aboriginal her life is invisible to the white
men who discover her corpse. Her identity is
her face and because of that it is a featureless
face incapable of inciting an ethical response.
«An ungrievable life is one that cannot be
mourned because it has never lived, that is, it
has never counted as a life at all». 21
The men’s inaction says nothing so clearly
as this: the dead Aboriginal woman did not
count to them – she was dead to them before
she died. Lawrence amplifies the poignancy of
this moment by giving one of the four men
(Stelios Yiakmis) an Aboriginal girlfriend
(Leah Purcell), as though to say he at least
should have felt something, even if the others
didn’t, and this certainly how his girlfriend responds.
In Butler’s terms, the men’s response is
significant because as she conceives it moral
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responsibility presupposes affect – it is only
because we are moved emotionally that we act
ethically she argues. If we aren’t moved to act
ethically by our grief for the plight of the other, then we will not do so.
Her hypothesis, which she acknowledges is
not entirely new, is that «whether and how we
respond to the suffering of others, how we
formulate moral criticisms, how we articulate
political analyses, depends upon a certain field
of perceptible reality having already been established». 22 We have to “see” the Other in
order to be moved by them. Blindness to the
Other is not merely unethical in this respect,
but the absence of the very possibility of ethics. But this blindness is never purely personal;
it is a product of social and cultural framing.
The fact that the four men fail to respond to
the discovery of the corpse in the manner we
might expect of them cannot be put down to a
sheer quirk of character, then, but has to be
treated as symptomatic of the frame – the society – that produced them. The four men responded as they did because the Aboriginal
woman was not perceptible in their field of vision – she was not alive to them in any sense of
the word.
How we respond to the world, the kinds of
moral and ethical choices we make, is conditioned by what she refers to, drawing very
loosely on Goffman, as the “frames” in which
our own lives are situated. The frame is a social and cultural formation like Bourdieu’s
habitus that the individual subject internalises
without ever being aware of having done so.
This amounts to saying that in a certain
sense our affect is not our own, it is socially
conditioned, or to use Butler’s preferred term,
it is framed. 23 Understanding how this frame
is constituted then becomes central to any understanding of ethics for Butler. She writes:
In particular I want to understand how the
frames that allocate the recognisability of
certain figures of the human are themselves linked with broader norms that determine what will and will not be a grieveable life. 24
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Butler thus stipulates that compassion is
the true wellspring of ethics, which may well
be so but nevertheless poses insuperable problems for the construction of an ethics whose
principles could, in the best Kantian sense, be
applied universally and uniformly.
What should we do, for example, in the case
where our sense of compassion deserts us, as it
apparently does for the four fishermen? Butler’s
way round this problem is to try to determine
how and under what conditions compassion
fails, but this is not a solution so much as the
opening up of a different kind of problem.
Asking why people are not compassionate
is not the same kind of project as determining
what would count as project: the former is an
anthropological inquiry (that may well be inflected by both sociology and psychology),
while the later is a philosophical project.
From a philosophical perspective, ethics
cannot (and should not) be based on the presence or absence of compassion because this
rules out the possibility of constructing an ethics on the basis of purely intellectual or “affectless” abstract grounds.
The main reason for this is that there are
plenty of situations one can imagine when affect might fail us, at least insofar as the elaboration of an ethics is concerned. For example,
I may feel very compassionate towards animals but nevertheless have no problem eating
meat in the full knowledge that an animal had
to die to provide my meal. My compassion
does not guarantee or even necessarily lead to
an ethical reaction or response on my part.
And more importantly, from cultural and social point of view, there is no perceivable flaw
in my “frame” for acting in this way.
The same impossible problem is raised by
the issue of abortion: my compassion for all
human life is contradicted if I accept the necessity for abortion. If, by the same token, I
am compassionate about the needs of the individuals whose lives are affected by unwanted pregnancy then I might want to make an
exception to my “rule” regarding compassion
for all life.
At this point affect ceases to be of any use

and the ethical decision one arrives at has to
be arrived at by reason. As such, we have to
call into question the so-called “corporeal
turn” in cultural studies and ask whether it is
really taking us in a direction that we want to
go. Having said, I am obviously in agreement
with Butler that the absence of an ethical response can and should be treated as the symptom of a particular kind of cultural or social
problem.
█ The ethics of the apology
This brings us to the third narrative moment of the film, which is in many ways the
most interesting and the most troubling.
When the men return from their fishing trip
and finally report their discovery, their inaction is met with shock and disbelief, particularly from their friends and family.
At this point of the story, in both the
Carver and Lawrence versions, the point of
view of the story switches over to Stewart’s
wife, Claire (Laura Linney), who is literally
disgusted by her husband’s inaction.
This disgust is sexualised inasmuch as
Stewart informs Claire of what happened on
his fishing trip only after he’d first had sex
with her. In the Carver story she is haunted by
thoughts of the dead girl and in some strange
way identifies with her, thus doubling her anger towards her husband. She wonders if
Stewart was thinking about the dead girl
whilst making love to her and all but accuses
him of necrophilia.
Her response is important because it suggests that there are two quite different dimensions to the national apology: on the one
hand, there is the socio-psychological dimension, the felt need to expiate guilt, selfreproach and shame; while on the other hand,
there is the political dimension, the acceptance of responsibility and the offer to
make amends. Claire’s response to her husband’s inaction takes both routes.
By contrast, Rudd’s apology was very much
of the first variety – it very carefully steered a
course that kept it clear of the political dimen-
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sion and played up the socio-psychological
dimension. The fact that a substantial number
of Australians did not share the feelings of
remorse Rudd expressed on their behalf raises
the interesting question of how they might
have responded to a more straightforward political mea culpa.
Claire is ashamed of her husband and his
friends and she tries to atone for that shame
by first of all trying to make contact with the
dead girl’s family and then, more concretely,
by raising money to pay for the funeral. Her
fundraising efforts are viewed with suspicion
by the townsfolk, who would generally prefer
that she let matters lie. Her husband Stewart
(Gabriel Byrne), whose decision it was to continue fishing, is seemingly incapable of understanding that what they did was wrong, and is
baffled and incensed by her actions: «Tell me
what I did wrong and I’ll listen». 25
Crucially the Claire character is an immigrant, as though to say only someone from
outside of the frame of Australian cultural and
political life is capable of seeing the truth and
feeling the shame of it. Perhaps, too, it is
meant to remind us that all Australians, with
the exception of the Indigenous Peoples, are
immigrants.
Importantly, it is the actions of her husband and his friends that shame her, actions
that she is not personally responsible for, but
nevertheless feels responsible before (to use
Deleuze’s important distinction).
Shame is in this sense a necessary complement of grief – there where grief was, so
shame should follow. Shame is what grief becomes when we take responsibility for the loss
of life that grieves us. Shame transforms the
socio-psychological into the political. Without
this transformation, grief is always at risk of
becoming melancholia, an indulgence in the
pleasure of being sad (as Victor Hugo memorably defined it).
Butler’s work spans this spectrum from
grief to mourning, but omits any consideration of shame as a philosophical concept – she
treats shame as the conservative’s weapon
against the culturally marginalised. Shame is,
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on this view, a destructive emotion that leaves
people feeling unable to enjoy their life or feel
secure in being who they are.
Her examples, drawn largely from the experiences of people who have been persecuted
because of their gender, race, sexuality, or religion, do tend to bear this out. Her most telling
example in this regard is the US military’s utilisation of shame as an instrument of torture
at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo. 26 Yet, one
might also say that it is precisely because of
the absence of shame on the part of the perpetrators that these hurtful acts of shaming can
occur.
It is in fact the power of shame that finally
compels the four men to acknowledge that
they had in fact committed a wrong for which
some form of amends was necessary. The difficulty the men have in recognising that what
they did was wrong mirrors Australia’s own
difficulty in accepting its actions toward the
Indigenous Peoples constitutes a wrong.
The major source of this difficulty is the fact
that they themselves were not responsible for
the woman’s death – yes, they neglected her
dead body when they discovered it, but ultimately that is unimportant in face of the larger
crime, namely her murder, and they had no part
in that. The logic here is similar to what Roland
Barthes described as the “inoculation” strategy
which consists of admitting to a “small” crime so
as to conceal a “big” crime.27
Of course, the men did not commit the
murder, so they cannot be expected to confess
to this, but the woman’s murder is not the only wrong at issue here. There is the wrong implicit in the very “frame” in which the men
find themselves; their utter disregard for the
life of the Aboriginal woman, evidenced by
their inability to grieve for her, is testament to
a much greater prior wrong, namely that of
racism itself. Not only do the four men not
grieve the death of the Aboriginal woman
whose body they found, they do not notice
their lack of grief, and it is this absence that is
the more telling of the two.
It is against this standpoint that former
Prime Minister John Howard’s insistence that
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the present generation cannot be expected to
take responsibility for the actions of previous
generations must be rejected as both unjust
and more importantly false.
This brings us to the fourth narrative moment of the film, the apology itself. The four
men attend the funeral of the murdered woman, which is conducted by the family in traditional fashion.
Stewart attempts to make an apology on
behalf of the group and a young Aboriginal
man confronts him and spits on him. From a
national allegory perspective this moment is in
many ways the most crucial – two years before
the official apology was made it anticipates
how the Indigenous Peoples might be expected to respond to an apology that is in reality too little too late.
Of course the apology was important and
many within the Indigenous community welcomed it, but that does not mean we should
not criticize it. The National Apology when it
was finally given was addressed specifically to
the “Stolen Generations” for the treatment
they had suffered.
And while there can be no question that
they were owed an apology, at the very least,
they were not the only ones owed an apology,
nor were their experiences the only experiences the Indigenous Peoples suffered for which
an apology might conceivably be owed (the
loss of their land, forced displacement from
their land, genocide, and so on, the list of
crimes is long).
As wrong as the Australian government
was in removing children from their families,
behind that wrong there is an even greater
wrong, which like the proverbial elephant in
the room has been studiously ignored by all
Australian governments.
I want to suggest that the apology to the
“Stolen Generations” was hollow without an
accompanying apology for the act of dispossession that created the conditions under
which it could have occurred.
As Agamben shows in his discussion of
Nazi Germany’s extermination of European
Jewry, it is the act of dispossession, which
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should be understood to mean dispossession
from the realm of rights and law, which creates the conditions of possibility for the latter
in all its actual brutality. As Agamben writes,
It is impossible to grasp the specificity of
the National Socialist concept of race –
and, with it, the peculiar vagueness and inconsistency that characterize it – if one
forgets that the biopolitical body that constitutes the new fundamental political subject is neither a quaestio facti (for example,
the identification of a certain biological
body) nor a quaestio iuris (the identification of a certain juridical rule to be applied), but rather the site of a sovereign political decision that operates in the absolute
indistinction of fact and law. 28
The sovereign political decision he is referring to is the proclamation on February 28,
1933, of the so-called “decree for the protection of the people and the State” which set in
place a permanent state of exception in which
all the previously existing laws protecting personal liberty, freedom of expression, and so
on, were suspended indefinitely. It was this
suspension of laws protecting the rights of citizens, and indeed the right to citizenship that
opened the way for the creation of the concentration camps – as the head of the Gestapo
noted, no official decree was needed to bring
the camps into existence since there was no
law to impede their creation. The camps effectively gave a specific spatial arrangement to
what had become (since February 28, 1933) a
generalised state of affairs affecting the whole
of Germany. 29
The paradoxical status of the camp as a
space of exception must be considered.
The camp is a piece of land placed outside
the normal juridical order, but it is nevertheless not simply an external space. What
is excluded in the camp is, according to the
etymological sense of the term “exception”
(ex-capere), taken outside, included through
its own exclusion. But what is first of all
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taken into the juridical order is the state of
exception itself. Insofar as the state of exception is “willed”, it inaugurates a new juridico-political paradigm in which the
norm becomes indistinguishable from the
exception. The camp is the structure in
which the state of exception – the possibility of deciding on which founds sovereign
power is realised normally. 30
I have quoted this at length because what I
want to propose is that the declaration of terra
nullius should be considered in the same way:
it too declares a state of exception in which
the sovereign gives themselves the right to determine who is to be included and who is to be
excluded.
By declaring the land “empty” or “vacant”
the colonialists gave themselves the right to
occupy land they could see was “owned” by
somebody else; the casuistry concerning the
definition of “occupied” was simply their way
of bringing the “facts” into alignment with the
“law”, but obviously had no influence on their
actual decision to occupy the land. It created
legal dispossession as an organising frame.
The issue concerning the right to occupy
the land was determined after the fact and was
only an issue at all to the occupiers because
they did not want to have to share their territorial booty with other European nations who
might happen along and decide to stake out a
claim as well. The right to occupy was from
the start a right to exclude.
The colonialists imposed the same model
of right on foreign lands that was exercised
over their own – the sovereign has the absolute right to declare an exception to any laws
that they have previously upheld. This perhaps explains why it didn’t trouble the consciences of the men who conjured this juridico-political foundation stone out of thin air.
Terra nullius did not so much deny the
prior ownership of the land by its Indigenous
Peoples as exclude them from the State that
established itself on their land; or, to put it another way, it determined that henceforth they
would only be part of the State as its excluded.

That is to say, as Agamben might put it, following the declaration of Terra nullius the Indigenous Peoples of Australia were included in the
State that established itself on their land
through their exclusion. And that is how the
Indigenous people of Australia have been treated ever since Captain Phillip planted his flag at
Sydney Cove on January 26, 1788.
█ Terra nullius
This is why the apparent overturning of
terra nullius by the High Court judgement in
Mabo vs. Queensland in June1992, while important, did not change the excluded status of
Indigenous people as much as might have
been expected, or indeed as much as has been
claimed.
To put it in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms,
terra nullius is the content of the form – it is
the particular shape the state of exception
took in the establishment of Australia as a
sovereign, colonial nation, not the formative,
originary instrument it is often taken to be.
That distinction must be reserved for the sovereign right to declare a state of exception and
as the years since Mabo have shown all too
clearly, that right is intact now as it ever was.
The state of exception is the form of the
content in other words. Contrary to the
standard view of things, then, I am arguing
that terra nullius is the expression of sovereignty, not its basis. 31 It was a convenient
means of legitimating at law (by suspending
the “existing” law of the land) what had already been accomplished in fact. Indeed, as is
the case with most declarations of a state of
exception, it is the fact that demands the suspension of law – confronted by the need to
justify their act of occupation, the colonial
powers declared the land terra nullius in order
to retain their entitlement to the land by suspending their own laws regarding the right to
occupy another person’s land.
This is clear in the judgement that socalled Native title can co-exist alongside
Crown title, but the Crown reserves the right to
extinguish it. So the judgement is in effect a
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case of yet another exception being made under
the auspices of an already existing state of exception. This is further confirmed by the fact
that the judgement also found that the previous
failure to recognise Native title, as regrettably
and egregiously racist as it undoubtedly was,
did not constitute the legal basis for any future
compensation claim. Putting it bluntly, it
amounts to saying that while terra nullius was
wrong as law, it was not a wrong at law.
The Australian government has shown itself to be profoundly unwilling to treat the Indigenous peoples as ordinary citizens, or indeed as individuals, with the same rights and
needs as other Australians. Instead, in a manner that stands comparison with Israel’s
treatment of Palestinians, it insists on treating
the Indigenous Peoples as a race apart. It justifies its stance with a duty of care rhetoric, but
as the “Stolen Generations” make plain its
model of care is largely unconcerned by the
plight of the individual.
The policy of removing “half-caste” children from their Aboriginal families and placing them with white foster families that created the ‘Stolen generations’ was in its own way
well-intentioned inasmuch as it was designed
to address a specific cultural “problem”, a
problem that the government felt it had a responsibility to address: as neither fully white,
nor fully black, it was thought by the white
policy makers that “half-caste” children had
no ‘proper’ place within the caste system of
(post-)colonial society. 32
But such a policy idea could only have been
ennacted because the Indigenous peoples were
literally non-citizens. 33 More than that, it
could only have happened because the policymakers viewed things from the perspective of
some notional “greater good” – the good of
the nation and the good of the race – that
rendered the misery endured by the children
as so much collateral damage.
The historical sleight of hand here is the
policy-maker’s presumption that the situation
of the “half-castes” was exceptional, thus requiring and legitimising exceptional actions
on their part. But one has only to try to imag-
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ine a similar policy being framed for use on
the hegemonic “white” Australian population
to realise that the reality is that such exceptional action could only be taken because as
“half” Aboriginal people they were “always already” locked into an exceptional situation.
Putting it bluntly, it was only because they
were already members of “the excluded” part
that has no part that they could be treated in
the way they were.
The government intervenes into the lives of
Indigenous Australians not only because it has
the right and the wherewithal to do so, but because ever since First Settlement the Indigenous Peoples have been regarded as “bare life”.
The persistence of this viewpoint – that
the government has the right to intervene the
lives of Indigenous Australians – was amply
demonstrated by the extraordinary events of
June 2007 that have become known simply as
The Intervention. 34 Prompted by the release of
the Little Children Are Sacred report prepared
by the specially convened Northern Territory
Board of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse (2007), the
“Intervention” refers to former Prime Minister
John Howard’s ill-fated decision to send military personnel into several Indigenous communities and impose what amounted to martial
law in the lead up to the 2007 Federal election.
Howard argued that the government not only
had a right but also a duty to intervene,
likening the situation to a national emergency
of the order of “Hurricane Katrina”.
The comparison might not have sounded
so misplaced if it also came with the admission
that if the problem is a national emergency
then it is so because the Federal government
has systematically failed to heed all warnings
of an impending crisis and diverted the necessary funds to address the issue elsewhere. As
Rebecca Stringer explains, Howard deflected
criticism of his policies by saying that the children in aboriginal communities are living in a
Hobbesian nightmare that must be remedied
by the imposition of «social order enforced by
legitimate authority». 35
While the report was unequivocal in find-
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ing that the incidence of sexual abuse in some
Aboriginal communities is at crisis level and
that the matter should be treated as one of national significance, nowhere in the report is
there a recommendation calling for an immediate and militarised intervention, and yet
that is precisely the course Howard chose in
formulating the Northern Territory National
Emergency Response (NTNER).
On the contrary, the report specifically
recommended extensive consultation with indigenous communities and a systematic attempt to end the chronic, real material deprivation these communities endure by improving government service levels to them. 36
If the NTNER proved politically toxic for
Howard, I would argue that it wasn’t because
he asserted the government’s right to intervene into the affairs of indigenous people and
both curtail their rights and deny them their
livelihoods; rather, I would suggest it was because it exposed too openly the depth of the
government’s responsibility for their plight.
It made all too apparent what had otherwise been forgotten, namely that the founding
of the nation was an act of violent dispossession. Rudd needed to offer an apology not only to distance himself from Howard, but also
to close down any debate about the government’s right to decide the fate of the Indigenous Peoples of Australia. And it is noteworthy that his apology makes no apology for this
– he apologises for the wrongs done to the Indigenous People, but not for the dispossession
of their land that not only led to these wrongs
being committed, but gave the perpetrators
the sense that they had the right to commit
these wrongs.
What makes Jindabyne so interesting, to
me at least, is the way it exposes and explores
this schism in the core of the national apology.
The apology follows a double refusal: first,
there is a refusal to accept that a wrong has
occurred; then, as the evidence mounts and it
becomes impossible to deny that a wrong has
occurred, there is a refusal to accept any blame
for the wrong. The apology that follows is
thereby rendered worthless in advance be-

cause it fails to meet its own minimum conditions of possibility – as defined by Derrida –
namely that it follows both an admission that
a wrong occurred and an acceptance of responsibility for that wrong. 37
The national apology to the Indigenous
Peoples has taken precisely this course too –
first, there was a refusal to accept that a wrong
has occurred; when the “Stolen Generations”
report made that position untenable there was
a steadfast refusal to accept responsibility for
the wrongs documented in the report. And in
this sense the apology that was offered by
Rudd was basically worthless, irrespective of
its supposed symbolic value, because it did not
acknowledge the founding violence that for
many continues to underpin the government’s
right to commit these wrongs as the NTNER
demonstrated all too clearly.
Viewed as a national allegory, Jindabyne is
asking us to look at the countless instances
where Aboriginal people have been treated as
the socially dead, as the non-living, as leading
lives that do not count as lives. Bringing Them
Home catalogued hundreds of actual examples
and even then only scratched the surface. The
point I want to make here in conclusion
though is not simply that the hegemonic white
people of Australia treat the marginalised
black people of Australia very poorly; that is
obviously the case. There is, however, an even
more disturbing point to be made and that is
that the hegemonic white people of Australia
are for the most part unaware that there is anything “wrong” in the way they act. Like the
four fisherman, they do not think they have
anything to apologise for and are awaiting
someone to tell them what they’ve done
wrong. One wonders if they’ll listen.
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